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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CONNIE WILCOX, DON WILCOX
and CONNIE WILCOX, As Guarddian ad Litem for PHILLIP WILCOX,
a minor,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation,
Defendant and Respondent
and Third Party Plaintiff,
-vs.Q. B. CORAY and ANGUS K.
WILSON,
Third Party Defendants.

Case No.
12246

BRIEF O·F APP·ELLANTS
NATURE OF CASE
AND
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs/Appellants, Connie Wilcox, Don Wilcox and Connie Wilcox, as Guardian ad Litem for Phillip Wilcox, a minor, from a Summary Judgment granted in favor of the Defendant/Re1

spondent, Salt Lake City Corporation, a municipal cor.
poration, and further from a denial of the Plaintiffs/.
Appellants' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint by
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County.
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, granted the
Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant/Respond.
ent on the 1st day of September, 1970, and denied the
Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion for Leave to Amend Com.
plaint on the 1st day of September, 1970.
The Summary Judgment was granted apparently on
the grounds and for the reason that based on the pleadings and depositions on file, the Complaint of the Plaintiffs/Appellants failed to state a claim against Salt Lake
City Corporation. The denial of the Motion for Leave to
Amend the Complaint was also apparently based on tbe
failure of the Complaint of Plaintiffs to state a claim
against Dr. Q. B. Coray and Dr. Angus K. Wilson, Third
Party Defendants, whom Plaintiffs were moving to name
as parties defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs/Appellants seek to have the decision of
the District Court granting the Summary Judgment
against them on behalf of Salt Lake City Corporation re·
versed and the matter remanded for trial. Further Plain·
tiffs/ Appellants seek to have the denial of the Motion
for Leave to Amend the Complaint naming Drs. Coray
and Wilson as parties defendant reversed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Connie Wilcox, one of the Plaintiffs in this action,
is a waitress at the Hotel Temple Square Coffee Shop and
has been since 1962. Each year, all persons dealing in
food services in Salt Lake City are required to obtain a
"Food Handler's Permit" which entails an annual tuberculin skin test pursuant to Sections 18-6-51, et seq., Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965. If the tuberculin skin test is positive, the Salt Lake City Department
' of Health requires the applicant to take chest x-rays to
determine the presence or absence of tuberculosis.
Prior to August, 1966, Connie Wilcox in an effort to
obtain her Food Handler's Permit had a tuberculin skin
test which was positive; thereafter, she was required by
the Salt Lake City Department of Health to submit to a
chest x-ray. After the x-rays were examined and reported
normal, she was issued a renewed Food Handler's Permit. Again in August, 1967, in an effort to renew her
Food Handler's Permit, Connie Wilcox returned to the
Salt Lake City Department of Health to obtain her tuberculin skin test. The Department of Health again reported a positive skin test and required a repeat x-ray.
In August of 1967, she went to the Salt Lake City
Department of Health and had a chest x-ray taken to
determine the presence or absence of tuberculosis. After
this x-ray was examined by either Dr. Angus K. Wilson
or Dr. Q. B. Coray, the two radiologists whom the Department of Health hired for examination of these x-rays, the
x-ray was reported normal and the Food Handler's Permit
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was issued. In the early winter of 1967, Connie WiJ.
cox's health began to deteriorate, and she lost weight
and felt generally weak. This condition became exag.
gerated and on the 1st of August, 1968, Connie Wilcox
went to David D. Christensen, M.D., specialist in internal
medicine and hemotology of the Granger Medical Center,
for an examination. Dr. Christensen took x-rays and conducted a complete examination of Connie Wilcox and
diagnosed her malady as tuberculosis; he further informed
her that due to the advanced state of the disease, she had
had tuberculosis as of the date of the taking of the x-ray
by the Salt Lake City Department of Health in August,
1967. Dr. David Christensen thereafter examined the x-ray
taken by the Salt Lake City Board of Health in August,
1967 and confirmed his diagnosis that the disease was
present in 1967 and was shown in the x-ray taken by
the city. (Deposition, David D. Christensen, M.D., Pages
15, 17, 23 and 24.)
In September, 1969, Ralph L. Tingey, M.D., F.C.C.P.,
a specialist in internal medicine and chest diseases, con·
ducted a complete examination of Connie Wilcox and
examined the x-ray taken by the Salt Lake City Department
of Health in August of 1967. Dr. Tingey confirmed the
diagnosis that Connie Wilcox had atypical tubercle bacilli
(a type of tuberculosis) and that the condition had ex·
isted in August, 1967, and was shown in the x-ray
taken by the city. (Deposition, Ralph L. Tingey, M.D.,
Pages 6, 7, 9 and 10)

From August 6, 1968 to August 12, 1968, Connie
Wilcox was confined to the isolation ward at Valley West
4

Hospital; she lost weight from 117 pounds to 103 pounds
from the winter of 1967 to the date of seeing Dr. Chris] tensen in 1968; she missed work from August 4, 1968
•through September 9, 1968; and she has suffered great
emotional upset and concern by the exposure of her hus. band and minor son to this disease.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY WHICH UNDERTAKES THE FUNCTION OF DIAGNOSING THE
PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF TUBERCULOSIS
MUST PERFORM THAT FUNCTION NON-NEGLIGENTLY.

It is the Plaintiffs/Appellants position that the Defendant/Respondent, Salt Lake City Corporation, or its
agents, failed to either properly examine or evaluate the
x-ray taken in August of 1967 and notify plaintiff, Connie Wilcox, of the results of the same, all to her damage.
Once the Salt Lake City Department of Health assumed the
obligation of holding itself out to the public as an agency
capable of diagnosing tuberculosis, it must thereafter
carry out this assumed duty in a non-negligent manner,
namely: The Department of Health must conduct the tuberculosis examination in a non-negligent manner and inform the persons examined that they either do or do not
I
· have tuberculosis. The failure of the Salt Lake City Depart, ment of Health to inform Plaintiff/Appellant, Connie Wilcox, that she had tuberculosis as of August 17, 1967, the
date the x-ray was taken, which fact was and is revealed
by the x-ray taken by the Salt Lake City Department of
1
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Health according to the testimony of both Drs. Christen.
sen and Ralph Tingey, was a negligent omission in the
duty of said Department of Health to notify persons tak.
ing the tuberculosis test of the proper results thereof.
The Salt Lake City Commission exercised discretion
when it established the requirement that all persons deal.
ing in food services within the Salt Lake City limits
shall be required to obtain tuberculin tests and enacted
Sections 18-6-51, et seq., of the Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City, 1965. Thereafter, any and all activities
with regard to the examination of applicants for "Food
Handler's Permits" were merely ministerial in nature and
required no discretion in informing said applicants
whether or not there is evidence of tuberculosis. It may
be said that when a state or state agency, by itself or
through its corporate creations, embarks on an enterprise
which is commercial in character or which is usually
carried on by private individuals or private companies,
it is engaged in a proprietary enterprise and accordingly,
should be held to the same standard of care as an indi·
vidual conducting said activities. Carroll v. Kittle, 457
P. 2d 21 (Kansas, 1969). There is an increasing trend on
the part of the courts and legislatures to limit or repu·
diate the immunity of governmental units and officers
and may be traced in two comprehensive and perceptive
papers. See Van Alstyne, "Governmental Tort Liability:
A Decade of Change", 1966 Illinois Law Forum, 919 to
980, and Van Alstyne, "Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Law Making in a Statutory Milieu", 15 Stanford
Law Review, 163, 1963. In the Kittle case, supra, plain·
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tiff's arm was virtually severed in an industrial accident
and was replanted by doctors at a state medical hospital.
In a state of post operative confusion, the plaintiff ripped
· off his bandages but was caught in time to prevent further self-inflicted harm. Knowing his disorientation and
self-endangering state, the defendants did nothing to prevent reoccurence and forty-eight hours later, the plaintiff
re-opened his wound necessitating amputation of his arm.
On plaintiff's appeal from the dismissal of his petition,
the Kans2s Supreme Court reversed and prospectively
i abolished tort immunity of the state and all its agencies
I when engaged in proprietary activities. The court fur. ther held that in the operation of the University of Kansas
Center and its hospital, the Board of Regents,
a st::>.te agency, was engaged in a proprietary activity. See
also the case of Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 359
P. 2d 457 (Calif., 1961 ), wherein the plaintiff negligently
was permitted to fall from a bed in a hospital operated
b)· a state agency. The court held on appeal that the
sovereign immunity of the state did not pertain where it
conducted a proprietary activity and it would be held to
the same standard of care as if an individual were conducting said activity.
![

Recent years have witnessed the judicial repudiation
of municipal immunity in Alaska, Arizona, Kentucky, Indiana, Idaho, Kansas, California and Arkansas. In the
case of Massengill v. Yuma County, 451 P.2d 639 (Ariz.
App., 1969), a dismissal was reversed. The allegations
of the deputy sheriff who followed but did not interfere
with or arrest two minor drivers whose driving was at
7

excessive speed, dangerous, reckless and illegal, and who
the deputy sheriff had reason to know had been drinking
was held to state a cause of action against the county,
the sheriff and the deputy sheriff actually involved. The
court rejected the contentions that the deputy sheriff was
shielded by "official immunity" and that he could not be
held for "mere non-feasance." The court stated:
"To say that an officer is responsible only to
the general public is merely a correlative and conclusory way of stating that a person injured by
the negligence of the officer has no remedy against
him. It seems, somewhat like the distinction between 'discretionary' and 'ministerial' acts, sus·
piciously like a ' * * * way of stating rather than
arriving at the result'. Nor do we find compelling
the logic of a distinction between 'misfeasance'
and 'non-feasance' as controlling the question of
official and public liability in this area * * *·
[T]he distinction between 'misfeasance' and 'non·
feasance', though of historical significance in the
development of our law often reflects nothing
more than a difference in semantic orientation ....
Substance rather than semantics should control
matters as serious as the rights and liabilities at
issue here. It is obvious that an individual can
be as badly damaged by inaction where there is
a duty to act as by action where there is a duty
not to act. The distinction between 'misfeasance'
and 'non-feasance' in this area is criticized by Pros·
ser in Law of Torts, Section 126 at 1017 (Third
Edition, 1964), and some courts have rejected the
distinction. We see nothing to be gained by giv·
ing the distinction renewed vigor in this jurisdic·
tion. Considered in the light of these fundamental
principles of the law of negligence, it seems to
us that plaintiff's complaints state a cause of ac·
tion. The complaints allege flagrant violations

*
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of the law and a clear opportunity for the defendant deputy to arrest prior to the occurrence of this
accident. The sufficiency of the allegations in this
regard are demonstrated by comparison with those
of Rubinow v. County of San Bernardino, 169 Cal.
App. 2d 67, 336 P.2d 968, 1959. All the gaps
noted in Rubinow are plugged by the allegations
of the present complaints. Nor can we say at this
stage and with only the allegations of the complaints before us that proximate causation is lacking as a matter of law."
In the case of Harold D. Cooper v. U.S.A., ____________ f,
Supp. ____________ , (Dist. of Nebr., Civil No. 02446, June 3,
1

1

1970), the United States District Court for the District
of Nebraska held in a federal tort claims case that the
failure of the defendant's medical agents at the Veteran's
Administration Hospital, to diagnose brucelloses, a disease developed by the plaintiff because of his working
over a period of years in a packing plant with dead animals, was more than error of judgment and did constitute actionable negligence. In that case, the plaintiff had
suffered for some twelve years from brucelloses prior to
admission to the Veteran's Administration Hospital, and
the latter took a complete history, including the plaintiff's contact with dead animals. The V.A. Hospital failed
to culture for the brucelloses organism and took only one
agglutination test. After an extended stay for about
fifteen months in the V .A. Hospital which failed during
that period to diagnose the plaintiff's chronic brucelloses,
the plaintiff voluntarily left the hospital. His physical
condition having greatly deteriorated during said fifteen
months V.A. hospitalization, he went to the Mayo Clinic
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where a positive diagnosis of brucelloses was promptly
made. The court held that the failure of the V.A. doc.
tors to culture for the brucelloses organism and the fail.
ure to have more than one agglutination test constituted
unacceptable and substandard medical practice. Moreover, the failure of the defendant's medical agents to
have formal and even informal consultation where as '
here the diagnosis is obscure constitutes substandard practice. The court went on to state that the defendant had
control over and was responsible for the plaintiff at a
critical time when the disease created or reached its height
and was capable of and did the majority of the damage.
The court stated:
"For that reason, it is the decision of the court
that the defendant is liable for a very substantial
part of the damage of the plaintiff's body, past
and future pain and suffering and medical, hos·
pital and surgical expense occurring after release
from the V.A. on or about September 1, 1965, and
those to be incurred in the future."
Compare also Steves v. U.S., 294 F. Supp. 446 (Dist.
of S.C., 1968); Hicks v. U.S., 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.,
1966); Price v. Nayland, 320 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
In the case of Cooper v. U.S.A., supra, Chief Judge Rob·
inson, writing a majority opinion, stated that although
mere error of judgment may not be actionable, a failure
to diagnose may very well be found to be causal negli·
gence where there is no or only inadequate laboratory or
clinical testing. Failure to perform proper tests leading
to faulty or failed diagnoses is actionable.

10

The State of Idaho has recently abolished state and
sovereign immunity from tort liability in four cases. In
the case of Hopper, et al v. State of Idaho, ____________ P.2d
(Idaho, No. 10315, April 27, 1970), Justice Donaldson
held:
"Because the notion expressed by the adage
'The Kind can do no wrong', offends our sense of
justice and because the doctrine of sovereign immunity runs contrary to the basic concept underlying the entire field of tort law that liability
follows negligence and that individuals and corporations are responsible for the negligent acts
of their agents and employees acting in the course
of their employment, this Court shall evaluate
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the light
of reason, logic and the actions, functions and
duties of our state in this twentieth century. The
following statement made by Justice Cardozo in
1921 is even more pertinent in 1970:
'If judges have woefully misinterpreted
the mores of their day or if the mores of their
day are no longer those of our' s, they ought
not to tie in helpless submission, the hands
of their successors.' Cardozo, The Nature of
the Judicial Process, p. 152 (Yale University
Press, 1921)

The court in the proper performance of its
judicial function is required to examine its prior
precedents. When precedent is examined in the
light of modern reality and it is evident that the
reason for the precedent no longer exists, the abandonment of the precedent is not a destruction of
stare decisis but rather a fulfillment of its proper
function. * * * [W]hile legislative reform of sovereign immunity might provide a more comprehensive and appropriate solution than judicial
11

abrogation nevertheless a start must be made
sometime somewhere and since it was this court
which originally breathed life into the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in the State of Idaho, it
falls within our province to snuff it out * * *
We hereby hold that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is no longer a valid defense in actions
based upon tortious acts of the state or any of its
departments, political subdivisions, counties or
cities where the governmental unit has acted in
a proprietary as distinguished from a governmental capacity. Where the governmental unit
acts in a proprietary capacity, the same rules of
tort law which are applicable to private individuals will now apply to governmental units. The
construction and maintenance of highways is a
proprietary function and has been so held by this
court****·"

*

In the Hopper case, the facts were starkly simple.
In the course of applying a "sealer coat" to the road sur·
face to the eastbound lane of a six mile portion of the
U.S. Highway, the Idaho Department of Highways had
stationed flagmen at each end of the project to warn
motorists that both east and westbound traffic was being channeled into the westbound lane of the highway.
During the afternoon of the accident, the flagman sta·
tioned at the easterly point of this project left his post.
Upon his departure, there were no flagmen nor any sig·
nalling device nor any sign at this point to warn the de·
ceased (approaching from the east) that the eastbound
traffic was also proceeding in the westbound lane. The
plaintiff's wife and her minor children were driving west·
erly when their car was struck by a bus then being driven
in an easterly direction on the wrong side of the highway.

12
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The wife was killed and the children injured as a result
of the flagman leaving his post.

In the case of Molitor v. Kanelane Community Unit
District No. 302, 163 N.E. 2d 89 (Ill., 1959), the Supreme
Court of the State of Indiana held in overruling prior inconsistent cases that the school district was liable for
burn injuries suffered by a pupil in a school bus accident
and stated:
"The whole doctrine of governmental immunity rests upon a rotten foundation."

In the case of Willis v. Department of Conservation
and Economic Development, 264 A.2d 34 (N.J., 1970),
Justice Weintraub, Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in prospectively ending the rule of
sovereign immunity in New Jersey:
"It is plainly unjust to refuse relief to persons endangered by the wrongful conduct of the
state. No one seems to defend that refusal as fair.
There has been a steady movement away from immunity. In some jurisdictions, the change has been
achieved by judicial decision. (Citations omitted)
and in others by statutes which consented
to suit in the courts and provided for relief before
an administrative or legislative body
We
have long entertained all types of tort actions
against counties and municipalities and when relief is refused it is upon the basis of the substantive principles of law we think should apply and
not upon the proposition that these agencies are
immune from suit
ltis time for the judiciary
to accept a like responsibility and adjudicate the
tort liability of the state itself."

***

****

****
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Chief Justice Weintraub, while concluding that this reforming decision should not be applied retroactively for
the reason that, "there are no appropriations to pay the
obligations the courts might declare", nevertheless ruled
that this progressive decision should be applied to the
plaintiffs in this case, "for the practical reason that case
law is not likely to keep up with the needs of society if
the litigant who successfully champions a cause is left
with only that distinction."
This Court, in the rnse of Rice v. Grm;ite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 0969), cited with approval the case of Finch v. Matthews (Wash.), 443 P.2d
833 at 842, and stated as follows:
" 'The legislature of this state has indicated
its sovereign immunity in tort actions is no longer
desirable or acceptable. (Citations omitted) The
modern trend in both legislative and judicial
thinking is toward the concept that the citizen has
a right to expect the same standard of honesty,
justice and fair dealing in his contact with the
state or other political entity which he is legally accorded in his dealings with other individuals.' "
The Defendant/Respondent, Salt Lake City Corpo·
ration, after being served with a Complaint in this mat·
ter, brought two motions, one to Quash Service of Process
and the other to Dismiss based on the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1, et seq., Utah Code An·
notated, 1953, as amended, effective July 1, 1966, on
the basis that the Complaint failed to state a cause of ac·
tion. These motions were argued before the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft, Judge of the Third Judicial District
14
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Court, and on the 7th day of October, 1969, Judge Croft
signed an Order denying the defendant's Motion to Quash
Service of Process and Motion to Dismiss and implicitly
ruled that the Complaint did state a cause of action.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act implicitly
states that a governmental agency can be sued by setting
forth a specific provision to cover such situations. The
statutory approach embodied in the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act is the "closed-in" approach. That is to say,
in performance of their governmental functions, "all governmental entities shall be immune from suit for any injury which may result"; but this immunity is a qualified
one which prevails "except as may be otherwise provided
in this act". Supra, 63-30-3. In short, the Legislature
provided for a general system of liability subject to specified exceptional situations in which immunity is retained. Therefore, the most significant aspects of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act are the provisions retaining
governmental immunity found in 63-30-10, U.C.A., 1953,
as amended.
Every kind of tortious damage is potentially the basis
for governmental liability and the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act expressly declares that when immunity is
waived, "liability of the entity shall be determined as
if the entity were a private person". Ibid, 63-30-4; also
c.f. Van Alstyne, Governmental Torts in Utah: Law Reform in Action, August, 1967, Advocati Litigare, page 1,
et seq.; and c.f. Note, Utah Law Review of 1967, page
120, et seq. The pertinent language of the statute relied
15

on by the Plaintiffs/Appellants in asserting that a specific provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
allows a claim in cases such as the instant is as follows
in Section 63-30-10:

"Waiver of Immunity for Injury Caused by
Negligent Act or Omission of Employee - Exceptions. - Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of his employment except if the injury:
( 1) arises out of the exercise or performance '
of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is
abused,

***"

Plaintiffs/Appellants contend that the failure to
identify tuberculosis bacilli in the x-rays taken in August,
1967, was not a discretionary function pursuant to subsection ( 1) above quoted; the only discretion that was
exercised came about when the Salt Lake City Commission established a requirement that all persons dealing
in food services within the Salt Lake City limits shall be
required to obtain tuberculin tests, and thereafter en·
acted Sections 18-6-51, et seq., of the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City, 1965. Thereafter, any and all activities
with regard to the examination of applicants for "Food
Handler's Permits" were merely ministerial in nature and
required no discretion in informing said applicants wheth·
er or not they did have tuberculosis.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is based on
Sections 810, et seq., of the California Government Code
16

enacted in 1963, and there have been two recent cases
out of the State of California specifically interpreting
the comparable provision in the California Code as that
quoted above, viz., Morgan v. County of Yuba (1964),
41 Cal. Rep. 508, and Sava v. Fuller (1967), 57 Cal. Rep.
312, 249 Cal. App. 2d ------------·
The Sava case was a wrongful death action involving the death of a child; her parents sued Thomas Fuller,
Ph.D. a botanist employed by the state, and the state itself. Pursuant to a Judgment after an Order sustaining
without leave to amend the demurrers of the defendants
named in the suit, plaintiffs appealed. The principal inquiry was into the statutory meaning of the words "exercise of the discretion vested in him" as used in the
Government Code, Section 820.2 of the California Tort
Claims Act of 1963. The deceased, a four year old child,
was suffering from bronchial pneumonia, an illness from
which she died the next day; the state botanist, defendant Dr. Fuller, who was then acting within the course
and scope of his employment was "retained, employed
and requested" by the physician of the young girl to
make an analysis of a plant "substance", the child may
have ingested. It was alleged that Dr. Fuller, holding
himself out to be an expert in the field of such analysis,
negligently examined the plant and identified it as "toxtic'', which it was not. Decedent's death was stated to
have been the proximate result of the incorrect analysis
because the treatment by the physician was thereafter
based upon the misinformation that ingestion of the toxic
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materials, rather than bronchial pneumonia, was the
child's ailment.
The California Court held that the state botanist
who allegedly held himself out to be an expert in the
field of plant analysis and who agreed to make an analysis
of the plant substance believed to have been ingested by
the child assumed a duty of care and was thereafter not
entitled to immunity from liability accorded public employees acting in the exercise of their discretion pursuant
to paragraph 820.2 of the California Tort Claims Act of
1963 which reads as follows:

"When employees not liable: Exercise of discretion. Except as otherwise provided by statute,
a public employee is not liable for an injury re·
sulting from his act or omission where the act or
omission was the result of the exercise of the dis·
cretion vested in him, whether or not such discre·
tion be abused."
As can be seen, the above language is very similar to that
of the comparable Utah statute ( 63-30-10(1)) previously
quoted.
The court in the Sava case goes on to cite with ap·
proval Morgan v. County of Yuba, supra, wherein the
California court had before it a case in which it was al·
leged that a prisoner had threatened the life of the plain·
tiff's decedent and the Sheriff had promised to give a
warning if the prisoner was released on bail. The pris·
oner was released, the warning was not given and the
decedent was killed by the man released. The defendant,
citing Section 820.2 of the California Tort Claims Act
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--claimed it was not liable since the sheriff in failing to
warn was performing a "discretionary act" even though
the discretion may have been abused. The court in that
case held that when the sheriff promised to act, he exercised a discretion; but that after he had promised to warn,
he had exhausted the only discretion involved. In failing
to give the warning he was merely negligently omitting
to perform an act voluntarily assumed.
Based upon the foregoing authorities, it is the position of Appellants that there is, in fact, a duty owing
from the state and/ or its political subdivisions which includes the Salt Lake City Department of Health to carry
out a duty once assumed under a discretionary act, in a
non-negligent manner.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO NAME DOCTORS
Q. B. CORAY AND ANGUS K. WILSON ASPARTIES
DEFENDANT.

Pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, 1953, as amended, the trial court is given liberal authority to allow amendments to pleadings when
justice requires. In the instant case, justice requires that
Ors. Coray and Wilson be named as parties Defendant.
At the time of the bringing of the original Complaint,
discovery was not adequate to reveal who as representative of the Salt Lake City Department of Health failed to
properly diagnose the x-rays of Connie Wilcox and not
until the deposition of the doctors had been accomplished
19

was this known to the Appellants. In the case of McCord
and Nave Mercantile Co. v. Glen, 6 Utah 139, 21 Pac.
500, this Court held that especially will the court exer.
cise the discretion to allow amendments to the Complaint
where the amendment does not tend to impair the de.
fendant's rights. The third party defendants failed to
show that their being named as parties defendant would
impair their rights and by the very language of the Rule
above cited, a party may amend his pleadings by leave
of court and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires.
It is the contention of the Defendant, Salt Lake City
Corporation, that Drs. Coray and Wilson were independ·
ent contractors and that the city is not responsible for
their acts or omissions. The Plaintiffs/ Appellants do not
argue with the factual or legal basis of their position, how·
ever, it is essential that the Doctors be named as defend·
ants in the event the contention of the city is upheld. To
hold otherwise would seriously prejudice the rights of the
plaintiffs and shield the Doctors from their acts or omis·
sions which Plaintiffs claim constitute negligence on
their part.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that once a governmental agency
holds itself out to the public as an expert in the field of
tuberculosis detection or undertakes the function of diag·
nosing the presence or absence of tuberculosis, the agency
must conduct said activities non-negligently. The Utah
statutes, case law and papers cited as well as the decision
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of the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Third District Court
Judge, denying Respondent's Motions to Dismiss and
Quash Service for failure to assert a claim, all argue for
the proposition that there is indeed an obligation flowing
from Salt Lake City or its subdivisions to carry out proprietary duties and functions assumed, in a non-negligent
manner. It is further submitted that there is evidence
that the x-ray of Connie Wilcox taken by the Salt Lake
City Department of Health in August, 1967, was not examined properly and, therefore, a question of fact arises
which should be resolved by a trier of fact.

Respectfully submitted,

J. DENNIS FREDERICK, ESQ.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
520 Boston Building
Attorney for Appellants
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